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The author discusses the expansion of strategic studies in 
Australian universities, the cold war concepts on which the 
studies are based and the dangers inherent in these develop­
ments.
O ur problem  lias been that wc expect the voice ot teno i 
to be fren/ied . and that ol madness irrational. It is quite 
the contrary in a world where genial, m iddleaged C»eneral> 
consult with precise social scientists about the param eters 
of the death equation , and the problem  ol its m axim ization.1
IX AMERICA, the 11011-military advisers to the Delense Depart­
ment, such as Herman Kahn, Thom as C. Schelling. Henry A. 
Kissinger and Albert Wohlstetter,. have been aptly termed crack­
pot realists" by C. W right Mills and ‘T  he New Civilian M ilitar­
ists-' by Irving Louis Horowitz. Although not officially connected 
to any branch of the armed services, they have assumed the pre­
dominant influence in many areas ol strategic policy. 1 hey have 
completely overwhelmed the military profession, in both quali­
tative and quantitative terms, in their contribution to the litera­
ture of strategic studies. They increasingly dominate the field 
of education and instruction in the subject. Indeed, with the 
exception of restricted fields ot professional knowledge, the aca­
demic and quasi-academic centres of strategic studies have displaced 
the staff colleges and war colleges. Despite the grumbles of the 
generals, the civilian militarists have created a more flexible and 
more potent war machine than anything that could have been 
imagined by the old service-club approach of the career men in 
the armed services.
T he new civilian militarists like to see themselves as presiding 
over the birth of a new academic science. In recent years, however, 
the validity of their methods, their utility to society and their 
integrity of purpose have all been called into question. 1 heir 
morality needs scrutinising according to some critics, while others 
argue that it is the scientific adequacy of their claims. In The War 
Game (1963), Horowitz indicted those men
trained  in  the strategy and tactics of m ilitary terrorism  who, under the  protection 
of university and governm ent agencies claim and proclaim  their neutrality
1 C. W right Mills, cited in David Horowitz, h o rn  Yalta In I'ietnam : Ameru.an  
Foreign Policy in the Cold War (Harm ondsw orth: Penguin Books, 1967) 
p.349.
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w ith respect to social and political values. . . T hey replace problem s of 
principles w ith  m atters of strategy. T hey prefer th ink ing  about the  un th inkab le  
at the  costs of any exam ination of w hat is possible and preferable. T hey inhab it 
a world of n igh tm arish  intellectual ‘play’ w hile rid iculing  the  ‘ossification’ of 
American m ilitary  posture. T hey seem to prefer ‘advisory’ positions and leave 
to politicians th e  actual tasks of acting o u t th e ir recom m endations (how else 
can they claim  to be ‘value n e u tra l’ w ith respect to scientific canons). In  brief, 
they are ‘m ilita ry ' m inds w ith ‘civilian’ status.
Others extend the terms of the indictm ent beyond either the com­
plete absence of morality or moral obscurantism. Philip Green, 
whose writings constitute the most formidable critique of “the new 
intellectual im perialism” of the civilian militarists, argues that they 
are to be condemned for being pseudo-scientific in their methods. 
They rely on a method of “scientific” analysis and a logic of 
“ra tional” action that obscures discussion of basic issues, rather than 
confronting the primarily political and moral questions of the 
nuclear age. T he specialist techniques they employ, such as game 
theory and systems analysis, are bogus when used to arrive at 
strategic decisions and merely give an air of expertise to positions 
arrived at in an arbitrary and subjective manner. These partisan 
strategic analysts confuse propagandist-salesmanship with science 
and their pseudo-science is a disservice to the scholarly community. 
In Deadly Logic <1966), Green argued that their work has
noth ing  to do  w ith ‘science’. T o  use in ap p ro p ria te  techniques th a t perm it 
analysis to consist w’holly of the  m anipu lation  of one’s own prejudices; to rest 
one's theorizing on an assum ption th a t alreadv contains in  it th e  conclusions 
th a t one wishes to reach—this is exactly the  opposite of w hat genuine scientists 
in any field actually do.
They assume, he went on, that questions of policy are beyond 
debate, thereby simply not discussing the crucial propositions that 
one makes about world conflict. In other words, they engage in 
“the vice of the depoliticalization of the political: the attem pt to 
fit essentially political questions into the strait jacket of so-called 
scientific analysis.”2
2 For critiques of the  new civilian m ilitarists, see Anatol R apoport, Fights, 
Games and Debates (Ann Arbor: University of M ichigan Press, 1960); R obert 
Paul Wolff, " T h e  Gam e of W ar,” The N ew  R epublic , 20 Feb. 1961, pp.9-13; 
P. M. S. Blackett, Studies o f War: Nuclear and Conventional (London: Oliver & 
Boyd, 1962), ch .10; Jam es R. Newman, T h e  R u le  of Folly (London: Allen & 
Unwin, 1962), p p .15-30; R obert Paul Wolff, “Reflection on Game T heory  and 
the N ature  of V alue”, Ethics, April 1962, p p .171-179; W alter Goldstein and 
S. M. M iller, “ T h e  Probabilities of Accidental W ar,” New  L e ft Review , May- 
Ju n e  1962, pp.21-33; Irving Louiz Horowitz, T h e  War Game: Studies o f the  
New  Civilian M ilitarists (N.Y.: B allantine Books, 1963); P h illip  Green, 
“Academic G am esm anship and the Realities of W ar”, Dissent, A utum n 1963, 
pp.392-395; W alter Goldstein and S. M. M iller, “ H erm an Kahn: Ideologist of 
M ilitary Strategy”, Dissent, W in ter 1963, pp.75-85; W alter Goldstein, “Tow ard 
a Strategy for Peace” N ew  University T h o u g h t, Dec. 1963-Jan. 1964, pp.30-45; 
R ichard  M erbaum , “ RAND: Technocrats and  Pow er”, N ew  University T hough t, 
Dec. 1963-Jan. 1964, pp.45-57; W alter Goldstein, "T heories of T herm o-N uclear 
D eterrence”, in  R alph  M iliband and Jo h n  Saville (eds.), T h e  Socialist Register
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T he institutionalized study of strategic problems in academic and 
quasi-academic centres outside the defence establishment is of course 
most developed in the United States.3 In Britain, the best-known 
research centre is T he Institute for Strategic Studies, but the scale 
of its work cannot be compared with the semi-official American 
research organisations such as the RAND Corporation or the Insti­
tute of Defense Analyses.4 Academic interest in strategic problems 
is underdeveloped in Australia where until recently the Australian 
Institute of International Affairs (AIIA) stood virtually alone. 
Academics have always played a crucial role in the activities of 
the AIIA, although the organisation is not officially attached to 
any university. T he present Federal President is Professor Norm an 
Harper, an historian at M elbourne University and a former Chair­
man of the Research Committee, who was succeeded in the latter 
post by Professor B. D. Beddie, a political scientist at the Australian 
National University. T he former Federal President was Professor 
Gordon Greenwood, an historian at the University of Queensland. 
Sir Alan W att, the full-time Director of the AIIA, and a former 
Secretary of the Departm ent of External Affairs, works from an 
office in the Departm ent of International Relations at the ANU, 
whose head is Professor J. D. B. Miller, editor of A ustralian Outlook 
which is published quarterly by the AIIA.
1964 (London: M erlin Press, 1964), pp.211-226; Anatol R apoport, Strategy 
and Conscience, (N.Y.: H arper 8c Row, 1964); Anatol R apoport, “C ritique of 
Strategic T h in k in g ”, in Roger Fisher (ed.), International Conflict and Behavioral 
Science (N.Y.: Basic Books, 1964), pp.211-237; Phillip  Green, “Social Scientists 
and N uclear Deterrence", Dissent, W in ter 1964, pp.80-91; Ph illip  Green, “ M ethod 
and Substance in  the  Arms D ebate” , W orld Politics, Ju ly  1964, pp.642-667; 
Anatol R apoport, "Chicken a la K ahn", The Virginia Quarterly R eview , Summer 
1965, pp.370-389; Irving Louis Horowitz, “ T h e  Conflict Society: W ar as a Social 
P roblem ”, in H ow ard S. Becker (ed.), Social Problems: A Social Approach  
(N.Y.: Jo h n  W iley and Sons, 1966), pp.695-749; Solly Zuckerman, Scientists 
and War (London: H am ish H am ilton , 1966), ch.5; P h illip  Green, Deadly Logic: 
T h e  Theory of N uclear Deterrence (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University 
Press, 1966); Sol Stern, “T h e  Defense Intellectuals”, R am parts, Feb. 1967, 
pp.31-37; Joseph E. Schwarz, “ Strategic T hought: M ethodology and  R eality”, 
in Charles A. McCoy and  Jo h n  Playford (eds.), A political Politics: A Critique  
of Behavioralism  (N.Y.: T hom as Y. Crowell, 1967), pp.55-74; Ph illip  Green, 
“ Science, G overnm ent and the  Case of R A N D ”, W orld Politics, Jan . 1968, 
pp.301-326.
T h e  new civilian m ilitarists have been defended locally by Hedley Bull, 
Professor of In terna tional R elations a t the ANU since 1966 and form er Director 
of the  Arms C ontrol and D isarm am ent Research U n it in the  British Foreign 
Office, in “Strategic Studies and Its Critics”, W orld Politics Ju ly  1968. For 
a c ritique of Bull’s position, see Max T eichm ann, “Strategy, Science and M orals”, 
Pacific, Nov.-Dee. 1967.
3 Gene M. Lyons and Louis M orton, Schools for Strategy: E ducation and 
Research in N ational Security A ffairs (N.Y.: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965.)
4 T h e  work of T h e  In s titu te  for Strategic Studies is described in  Laurence 
W. M artin, “T h e  M arket for Strategic Ideas in  B rita in”, T h e  Am erican Political 
Science Review, M arch 1962, pp.23-41. See also Lyons and M orton, op.cit., 
pp.9, 281-285.
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In recent years there has been a substantial expansion of the 
activities of the AIIA. A grant of US S75,000 from the Ford Founda­
tion in 1962, conditional on the appointm ent of a full-time Director, 
enabled a three-year research project on Australia’s relations with 
South-east Asia to be undertaken. T o  cover additional costs and 
make provision for the expansion of work after the Ford grant 
was exhausted, the AIIA launched a public appeal in 1964 for 
S200,000. T he appeal was launched by the Minister for External 
Affairs and the Federal Government also helped by making contri­
butions tax-deductible. A useful sum was collected, but the target 
figure was not achieved. As it turned out, the Ford Foundation 
again came to the rescue in March 1968 with a further grant of US 
SI00,000 lor a second third-year project on Australia’s relations with 
South-east Asia.5
Another grant from the Ford Foundation, the size of which was 
undisclosed, enabled the ANU to establish in 1963 the Defence 
Studies Project within the Departm ent of Political Science. The 
grant came through the AIIA, and from 1963 to 1966 the Project 
was led by Professor A. L. Burns. In September 1964 it conducted 
a seminar of military personnel, public servants and academics who 
considered the conditions of dispersal of nuclear weapons about 
the Indian  and Pacific Oceans and the conditions under which 
Australia might become an owner or a host. T he authors of the 
three papers presented at the Conference openly declared their 
assumption that no m atter what m ilitary or economic inadequacies 
were revealed in China at the time of writing, sooner or later she 
must become strong and therefore a threat to surrounding nations 
and to Australia.6
T he gradual awakening ol academic interest in strategic studies 
in Australia led one of its leading proponents, Dr. T. B. M illar ol 
the Departm ent of International Relations at the ANU, to look 
optimistically into the future when he addressed the annual con­
ference of the Australian Regional Groups of the Royal Institute 
of Public Administration in November 1965 on the need for 
developing institutionalized study of strategic problems:
We have lived for so long in our political backwater that we came to believe 
that strategy was som ething that concerned o u r allies bu t not us. And out 
(■overnment, which appeared  to have discovered the  secret of perpetual rule, 
aided bv a bureaucracy which did not especially want its com fortable seclusion 
invaded, convinced us for a long tim e that defence was a subject which could 
safely be left to the experts inside the high stone walls along St. Kilda Road. 
Perhaps Russell H ill lias caught the winds of change. Perhaps such few
5 T h e  Herald, -1 Sept. 1964; The Age, 16 Oct. 1964; The Herald, 3 Oct. 
1966: T h e  Australian, 9 A pril, 1968.
6 A. I.. Burns. N ina H eathcote and P. King. Xuclear Dispersal in Asia 
anil the Indo-Pucifie Region  (Canberra: A ustralian Institu te  of In ternational 
Affairs and T h e  A ustralian N ational University, 1965.)
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academics as arc seriously interested in defence are believed to be a ra th e r more 
po ten tia lh  respectable bunch these days. Perhaps the Yict Cong and I)r. 
Sukarno have aroused us all to an awareness of the dangers around us and the 
need of an inform ed public  opinion to help produce or accept the  necessary 
measures to meet them . W hatever the  reason, it does seem that a better 
relationship  is developing between all those in the com m unity who are concerned 
about defence m atters.7
T he gap between Russell Hill and Acton rapidly closed in the 
second half of 1966 with the establishment of the Strategic and 
Defence Studies Centre at the AXU,8 which incorporated the 
facilities of the Defence Studies Project. Its gestation period, how­
ever, did not proceed quite as smoothly as its initiators had anti­
cipated. Ill the Australian Financial Review  (3 Aug. 1966), Max­
imilian W alsh reported that there was a strong division of opinion 
at the AXU on the proposal to set up the Centre. A meeting of the 
heads of departments attached to the Research School ol Pacific 
Studies discussed the scheme, but the opposition was so strong 
that its proponents avoided putting any recommendation to the 
vote. T he chief objection recorded was the high content of classi­
fied information likely to be contained in papers em anating trom 
projects sponsored by the Centre. T he dependence ol Centre 
personnel on access to classified material would result, it was leii, 
in an impingement on the academic independence oi the Centre, 
since its start would have to be cleared with both the Department 
ol Defence and the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation. 
The critics also argued that the source of the Centre’s iunds could 
link its work too closely to the general aims ol US loreign policy. 
Nevertheless, one of the leading proponents ol the Centre, Sir John 
Crawford, the then Director of the Research School ot Pacific Studies 
and subsequently Vice-Chancellor of the AXU, told Walsh that he 
intended to press ahead with the proposal. He also strongly denied 
the allegation that the Ford Foundation had offered to finance the 
Centre. Subsequently, Tribune  (24 Aug. 1966) reported that two 
representatives from the Ford Foundation had arrived at the AXU 
just before the meeting of departm ental heads in the Research 
School of Pacific Studies. A subsequent item in the Australian 
Financial Review  (19 Aug. 1966) stated that some opposition to 
the Centre had been elim inated by the decision that its research 
projects would not be classified, but other critics feared that classi­
fication would probably be introduced at a later stage.
These fears were far from groundless. In the previous year, 
M illar had drawn attention to the use that the US Administration 
made of non-government defence and strategic experts from the 
universities and organizations such as the RAX’D Corporation,
7 T . B. M illar, "T h e  C on tribu tion  of Acadcmit Personnel and Research 
Institu tions to Defence", P ublic A dm inistra tion  (Sydney) , March 1900, pp.27-2H.
8 T. B. Millar, "Defence in the U niversities” , The B ulletin , 1 Oct. 1900, p.29.
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before suggesting that the aid of academics should be enlisted in 
Australia.9 Reviewing the book, Malcolm Fraser, M HR, who be­
came M inister for the Army shortly afterwards, pointed out that 
M illar had not mentioned that the academics who participated 
in the American research projects underwent a security classification 
which involved certain restraints and vows of silence on those 
involved.
Fraser then posed the question: “W ould Australian academics 
and defence publicists be prepared to undergo similar restraints?”. 
10 Indeed, M illar himself had raised the problem during his 
address to the Royal Institute of Public Adm inistration in Novem­
ber 1965:
T here  are certainly security problem s in associating academics and research 
in stitu tions in  activities involving classified inform ation , bu t they are not 
insoluble. Each ind iv idual m ust be security cleared, and proper precautions 
taken over docum ents or m aterials or processes. Only those in itiates who do 
no t wish to share th e  sanctum  believe th a t i t  is impossible to do so w ithout 
rending the  veil.l 1
Despite the opposition of a num ber of senior ANU academics, 
the Centre was speedily established. N ot unexpectedly, M illar was 
appointed to the position of Executive Officer, the “climax” — to 
quote the Australian Financial Review  — of “a meteoric rise in 
the academic sphere” since he joined the ANU as a Research 
Fellow in In ternational Relations in June 1962. In August 1964 
he was appointed Fellow and promoted to the position of Senior 
Fellow in July 1966. In  1968 he moved up another rung in the 
academic ladder to the position of Professional Fellow. G raduating 
from the Royal M ilitary College at D untroon in 1944, M illar 
served as an infantry officer in the AIF at Morotai and later with 
BCOF in Japan. After the war he resigned from the Army and took 
his B.A. degree from the University of W estern Australia. Moving 
to M elbourne as a teacher at H untingtow er School, conducted by 
the Christian Science Church, to which he belongs, M illar worked 
part time towards his M.A. at M elbourne University which he 
completed in 1958. T he thesis topic was the “History of the Defence 
Forces of the Port Phillip District and Colony of Victoria 1836- 
1900”. He then proceeded to the University of London, where he 
gained his Ph.D. in 1960. Before transferring to the ANU in 1962, 
he lectured in  m ilitary history at Duntroon.
M illar holds strong public political views, going well beyond 
those civilian militarists who merely call for increased defence
5 T . B. M illar, Australia's Defence (M elbourne: M elbourne University Press,
1965), p.4.
10 Australian Journal of Politics and H istory, Dec. 1965, p.403.
' I M illar, “ T h e  C ontribu tion  of Academic Personnel and Research Institu tions 
to Defence,” p.30.
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expenditure and the im portance of m aintaining the American 
alliance. At the first university “teach-in” on Vietnam at the ANU 
in 1965, he supported Australian intervention, along with Peter 
Samuel and Tom  Hughes, Liberal M HR. A report of his speech 
in The Australian (24 July 1965) indicated that he believed the 
situation in South Vietnam was like the two Australian Communist 
Parties amalgamating under the leadership of the “Chinese” group 
and, with encouragement and assistance from the Communist gov­
ernments of New Zealand and Indonesia, beginning in Queensland 
“a campaign of terror, or murder, coercion and persuasion aimed at 
taking over the nation by force.” Moreover, he pointed out, the 
insurrection broke out while “Sir James Cairns” was Prime M in­
ister. M illar’s principal argument in favour of Australian in ter­
vention was that “we are committed to the defence of South Viet­
nam  by the Seato treaty.” Unless we assist the U nited States in 
Vietnam, we cannot expect them to help us when we are in trouble. 
In any event, he concluded in a vain attem pt to silence the critics, 
“T he Government has access to far more inform ation than we have.” 
It is interesting to note that M illar has not spoken at any subsequent 
“teach-ins” on Vietnam, and has refused an invitation to participate 
in one at Monash, but he still strongly supports Australian inter­
vention.
M illar is especially critical of those Australians who are opposed 
to Australia’s intervention in South Vietnam. In  Australian Neigh­
bours (July-Aug. 1965), published by the AIIA, he made the follow­
ing comment on Australian defence and foreign policy:
I feel m any of the  criticism s to  be m isguided, and feel th a t a large p roportion  
of the  critics w ould change th e ir a ttitudes if they were obliged to forsake 
the luxury  of opposition for th e  responsibilities of form ulating  and im plem enting 
governm ent policy. M uch of the  criticism  appears to  be based on the  theory 
th a t we should trust and cultivate (or bribe?) po tential enem ies while d istrusting  
and refusing to assist o r support acknowledged friends.
Non-Communist critics, he continued, “tend to equate communism 
with all that is natural, inevitable, progressive, wholesome and 
democratic.” T he United States “stands in the way of the Chinese 
expansion.” T he Indians “have become much more appreciative 
of the value of friends in the West since their experience of a 
Chinese invasion.”
On this last point, it would be interesting to hear M illar’s views 
on the writings of Dr. Alastair Lamb, not to mention a statement 
by General Maxwell Taylor in testimony before the US Congress 
in which he adm itted that India started the Sino-Indian border 
war of 1962 by militarily “edging forward in the disputed area.” 
(UPI, 18 April 1963).
Another theme frequently stressed by M illar is that the “Viet 
Cong” are simply “terrorists". In an ABC broadcast several years
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ago which was later included in  a booklet entitled Ferment in Asia 
(edited by Professor Norman H a rp e r), M illar summed up the 
"Viet Cong” as a ‘‘powerful internal terrorist army” :
N orth  Viet Nam seeks to  extend its Com m unist system over the  south and 
in to  Laos and perhaps Cambodia. Only the U nited States, massive and alien, 
stands in  the way. T h e  Americans seek to contain Chinese hegemony; to lim it 
H anoi's control to N orth  Viet Nam; to prove th a t the  Com m unist m odel of 
subversion and revolutionary warfare is no t inevitable and invariably successful, 
even w ith an adjo in ing  Com m unist state; to m ain tain  the rig h t of small 
nations to exist.
U nited States’ measures to assist economic, social and political 
developments in South Vietnam, M illar wrote in The Bulletin (6 
March 1965), “have largely failed for a single basic reason: the 
systematic campaign of m urder and sabotage by the Vietcong 
designed to deny the aid to the South Vietnamese people.” Were 
the U.S. to withdraw from South Vietnam, he continued, “the 
whole of its carefully-fostered and genuinely deserved reputation in 
Asia as a bulwark against Communism and a support against 
poverty would be irreparably damaged.”
“Chinese expansionism” was the basic assumption of M illar’s 
paper on “A ustralia’s Defence Needs” which appeared in Australia’s 
Defence and Foreign Policy (1964), edited by John Wilkes:
1 hat the  Chinese People’s R epublic, w ith its standing arm y of some three 
m illion m en, has supported  and will support subversion, revolution, and even 
overt invasion th roughout South-East Asia in an a ttem pt to  ensure th a t the 
region is controlled by comm unist governm ents sym pathetic or preferably 
subord inate  to C hina; and that if C hina were to gain control of the  m ainland, 
A ustralia w ould be in  a very difficult position. T hus in  help ing to defend 
South Vietnam , T h ailan d  and Malaysia, A ustralia  contributes directly to its 
own defencc.
Australia, he continued, was helping to defend South Vietnam 
from “externally-backed communist subversion, infiltration, terror­
ism and aggression.” Moreover, “We need to ensure that our ser­
vicemen are ideologically armed — not ‘indoctrinated’, but aware 
of the great benefits of the democratic way of life, and the Christian 
values which are the basis of our society.” In this paper, and in his 
other writings, he argued both that “we must prepare now to meet 
the future th rea t”, and that China is at present both unable and 
unwilling to invade Australia.
In  fact, in his m ajor work to date — Australia’s Defence (1965) 
— M illar is even more contradictory, as one of his persistent critics, 
Max Teichm ann, pointed out in Arena, Summer 1966, and also in 
■a paper on “Non-Alignment — A Policy for Australia” in Aspects 
of Australia’s Defence (1966). On the one hand, M illar referred 
to the “expanding imperialism of the Chinese People’s R epublic” 
(p.31); on the other hand, we were told that not only does China 
not have the means to launch an invasion of Australia but that
•10
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“it would seem unlikely, at this stage, that the Chinese Government 
has any desire to do such a thing.’’ (p.59)
These quotations should be sufficient to make clear the intensity 
with which M illar holds Cold W ar assumptions, and also his tenden­
cy to denigrate opponents on the grounds of naivete or worse. Not 
surprisingly, then, we note an item in News-Weekly (12 Oct. 1966) 
announcing that forthcoming speakers before the Canberra Branch 
of the Defend Australia Committee, the leading pro-Vietnam 
lobby group in the country, would be Senator F. P. McManus of 
the DLP, Mr. Malcolm Fraser, the Minister for the Army, and Dr. 
T . B. Millar.
M illar’s Cold W ar assumptions are not shared by all non-Com- 
munist specialists. T hus we find two young Australian social sci­
entists writing as follows:
T h e  fact th a t C hina has given aid  and  comfort to her allies in  neighbouring  
countries, th a t she has taken strong measures to subjugate an area jurid ically  
regarded as p a rt of C hina, and th a t she has m ade a brief foray in to  Ind ia  
(over a border dispute as genuine as such disputes can ever be, and probably 
under provocation) should not deceive us in to  th in k in g  th a t Com m unist 
C hina has perform ed any acts com parable to the in te rnational aggressions of the  
1930's and 1940’s. 12
Even more interesting are two evaluations of China in 1966 by 
Alastair Buchan, Director of the Institute for Strategic Studies in 
London, and by Roderick MacFarquhar, editor of The China 
Quarterly, published by the Congress for Cultural Freedom. 
Buchan described C hina’s objectives as follows:
It is very easy to p u t together the  stream  of abusive editorials in  the Peking  
Daily w ith the  facts of C h ina’s population , her nuclear weapons program m e— 
and her agricultural poverty, to create a n ightm are prospect of an over-populated 
and vindictive great n a tion  expanding in  every direcion, and provoking the 
first nuclear war in th e  process. I t  seems to me there  is little  justification, 
certainly in Mao's statem ents, for this view . . . C ertainly C hina w ould like to 
re^pver her influence over areas like V ietnam  and Laos, as to some extent 
she has done over Cam bodia, and this leads her to be an  active supporter 
of indigenous revolutionary  m ovements. But she has never p rom oted any 
in te rnal ‘wars of liberation ', only encouraged them  where they develop 
naturally . I can see no evidence th a t she wishes for a satellite em pire in Asia, 
while there  are clear signs th a  she is becoming increasingly absorbed in  her 
own domestic and political problem s.
12 A nthony C lunies Ross and  Peter King, Australia and N uclear Weapons 
(Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1966), pp.56-57. M illar’s m ost recent work, 
Australia's Foreign Policy (Sydney: Angus & R obertson 1968), continues to 
argue th a t China is a m ilita ry  th rea t to Australia a lthough  not an  im m ediate 
one, and th a t the  th rea t m ust be m et m ainly by m ilitary  measures. ‘‘In  fifty 
years tim e (Australia) could be a G reat Power — or a g ranary  tr ib u ta ry  of an 
Asian em pire.'' For a critical review of the  book by a fellow firm  believer in 
the  desirability of continuing A ustralian-A m erican alliance, see M ilton Osborne 
in T h e  Age, 14 Sept. 1968.
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T here were “no signs that she is losing her innate caution, or that 
she wishes to rule Asia by force.'’ Consequently:
If this view of Chinese policy is correct, there  is no case for creating an 
in tegrated  m ilitary  coalition of he r pow erful neighbours and the  external 
powers to ‘con tain ’ her physically as the  Soviet U nion had to  be ‘con tained’ 
in W estern and South-eastern Europe in the  1950’s.
Successive US Secretaries of State from Dean Acheson to Dean Rusk, 
he concluded, have wrongly described China as an aggressive power 
which must be physically confined by direct military confronta­
tion.13
M acFarquhar noted that “there is little evidence to suggest that 
the Chinese are interested in actively trying to initiate or master­
m ind subversion abroad.” Moreover, “Mao does not think in terms 
of the aggressive use of force, even in the absence of countervailing 
American poiver, except in the case of the ‘restoration area’, and 
not necessarily even there.” Fear of Chinese expansionism, Mac­
Farquhar concluded, is “mistaken.”14
Let us now examine some of the activities of the Strategic and 
Defence Studies Centre, whose Advisory Committee comprises Pro­
fessors Sir John Crawford, H. W. Arndt, B. D. Beddie, Hedley 
Bull, A. L. Burns J. D. B. Miller, P. H. Partridge and W. E. H. 
Stanner of the ANU, the ubiquitous Sir Alan W att and of course 
Dr. T . B. Millar. In  September 1967, the Centre held its first major 
conference, a seminar on B ritain’s withdrawal from Asia, whose 
proceedings were edited by M illar and published under the title 
Britain’s Withdrawal from Asia■ Its Implications fdr Australia. 
T he Conference was private and attended by academics, public 
servants, parliamentarians, diplomats, and a selected group from 
the Press. Papers were presented by M illar himself, Professors J. D.
B. Miller, A. L. Burns and W. E. H. Stanner, Mr. Geoffrey Fair- 
bairn of the ANU, Dr. D. E. Kennedy of the University of Mel­
bourne, Dr. H. G. Gelber of Monash University, and three journal­
ists, Mr. Denis W arner (The Herald), Mr. Creighton Burns (The  
A g e) , and Mr. Peter Robinson (The Australian Financial R ev iew ). 
T he published proceedings of the conference came out just before 
Britain definitely announced that it would be withdrawing east of 
Suez in the near future. Peter Samuel’s review in The Bulletin  
(13 Jan. 1968) was headed “Non-Policies from a Roomful of 
Tories”. T he book, he began, was “an account of how our foreign 
affairs establishment protects itself against ideas.” Some of the 
papers were “outstandingly frivolous”, and he specifically cited
H. G. G elber’s suggesting th a t the  British are no t really disengaging, J. D. B. 
Miller's gentilities on the need to consider foreign policies o ther th an  All-the-
13 A lastair Buchan, "A n Asian Balance of Power?” Australian Journal of 
Politics and H istory, Aug. 1966, pp.274-275.
14 R oderick M acFarquhar, Chinese A m bitions and British Policy (London: 
Fabian T rac t 367, 1966), pp.8, 11.
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way-with-LBJ (concluding w ith ‘T hey may not com fort us, bu t they do make 
us th in k ’) and D. E. K ennedy’s parade of well-worn points about SEATO which 
evoked, in discussion, the  priceless conclusion that an alliance ‘less specifically 
opposed to Com m unism  m ight appear desirable, bu t against whom would 
it be directed?'
M illar’s mistake, Samuel concluded, was in not inviting along to 
his seminar people “who m ight have shaken his conservatives a 
little in their rut. A Santamaria, a Knopfelmacher, a Cooksey, a 
Colin Clark, or a Teichm ann or two were desperately needed.” 
For the record, it should be made public that Max Teichm ann 
was not invited, despite the fact that he had argued that B ritain’s 
withdrawal from Southeast Asia was inevitable in a paper at the 
1965 conference of the Australasian Political Studies Association 
and in an article entitled “Protecting Ourselves” in the Spring 1966 
issue of Dissent.
Seminars are also held regularly at the Centre and speakers from 
outside the ANU have included Douglas Pike, author of Viet Cong, 
G. Jockel of the Departm ent of External Affairs, Air Marshal E. 
Reyno of the Royal Canadian A ir Force, Group Captain D. B. 
Nichols, Director of Legal Services in the RAAF, and Professor 
Lincoln P. Bloomfield, a former senior State D epartm ent official 
now at the Centre for International Studies at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, which was financed until recently by the
C.I.A.
One revealing aspect of the Centre's work is their current interest 
in the techniques of counterinsurgency warfare. They have already 
held one seminar on the subject and there will be another in  the 
near future. T here are no indications to date that they intend to 
emulate such large-scale exercises in “counter-insurgent prophy­
laxis” as Project Camelot, sponsored a few years ago by the US 
Army under the aegis of the American University and eventually 
cancelled by former Defence Secretary Robert McNamara follow­
ing widespread criticism in Latin America.15 T he old formula 
for counterinsurgency used to be ten soldiers for every guerrilla. 
Now the formula appears to be ten social scientists for every guer­
rilla. Counterinsurgency projects implicitly identify revolution and 
radical social change with social pathology, and order and stability 
with social health. T h eir general purpose is to reduce the likeli­
15 See Irving Louis Horowitz (ed.), T h e  Rise and Fall of Project Camelot 
(Cambridge, Mass.: M IT  Press, 1967); M arshall W indm iller, “T h e  New American 
M andarins” and K athleen Gough, “W orld Revolution and  the  Science of M an", 
in T heodore Roszak (ed.), T h e  Dissenting Academy  (N.Y.: Pantheon Books 
1967).
For a plea by a m em ber of the  Defense D epartm ent in W ashington for more 
social science research to back up  US m ilitary  involvem ent in the T h ird  W orld, 
see T hom as H. Tackaberry, "Social Science Research, Aid to C ounterinsurgency”, 
T h e  American Journal o f Economics and Sociology, Jan . 1968, p p .1-8.
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hood of social disturbances or revolutions in  the T h ird  World. 
T he possibility that all or some revolutions may be justified or 
desirable is not considered, nor is any interest shown in how to 
assist Left insurgency movements in dealing with dictatorial govern­
ments of the Right. Implicit in the concept of “counter-insurgency” 
is an assumption that revolutionary movements are dangerous to 
the interests of “the free world” and that the US and its close allies 
must be prepared to assist counterrevolutionary measures to repress 
these movements. Professor Edgar S. Furniss, Director of the 
Mershon Social Science Program in N ational Security at Ohio State 
University, has warned that counterinsurgency theorizing, like 
deterrence theorizing, is “equally poisonous for social science study 
and research.”16 And Conor Cruise O ’Brien has argued convincingly 
that many social and political scientists accept, although they do not 
proclaim, the principle of “counterrevolutionary subordination.” 
One can assume the continued prom otion by the U nited States and 
its satellites of counterrevolution in the underdeveloped countries, 
and in this kind of situation the real danger to academic integrity 
comes from “counterrevolutionary subordination.” ’7
It is undeniable that some scholarly research is being undertaken 
at the Centre, but the world’s problems are defined in terms 
extremely close to what the Left feels to be the perception of world 
problems held by the Australian Government.
Relations between the Centre and the defence departments are 
cordial. Although no formal links exist, the Centre has effective 
access to government and they certainly hope to influence govern­
ment policy. A peace institution on the other hand, not only would 
be denied these informal links but it would be neither as influential 
nor as well-financed. Some of the projects already undertaken at 
the Centre are sober and serious pieces of research, but they are 
wholly within the framework of the Cold W ar perspective. The 
American counterparts of the Centre and the quasi-academic insti­
tutes like the RAND Corporation are unquestionably oriented 
towards the general perspectives, if not always the concrete policies, 
of the American foreign policy elite. They hold the same im portant 
assumptions as the official U nited States position, and these basic 
assumptions are not put to any kind of test. In the case of RAND, 
although its research workers have been intellectually independent 
to the extent of strenuously questioning their employer’s policies, 
they have not been “independent” to the extent of questioning
1 * In troduction  to Green, Deadly Logic, p.ix.
17 Conor Cruise O 'Brien, “ Politics and the  M orality of Scholarship”, in  Max 
Black (ed.), T h e  M orality of Scholarship (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1967), p .71. I t  is believed that the Strategic and Defence Studies C entre at 
the ANU has recently begun a substantive study of nuclear weapons for 
A ustralia.
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either the nature of the jobs they are performing or their basic 
values. As Max Teichm ann wrote in the Spring 1967 issue of 
Dissent when discussing social science institutes or projects in 
receipt of CIA or US m ilitary finance:
Such an institu te  need no t produce loaded or contam inated  research—but 
it will be influenced by a d istorted  order of research priorities. Some avenues 
of research and some hypotheses would almost certainly be excluded, for fear 
of producing unpala tab le  conclusions or unacceptable prescriptions. T hus 
how m any US foundations would go on financing a M ilitary In stitu te  which 
started  producing studies showing the  desirabiliy of u n ila tera l nuclear d isarm a­
m ent. or armed neu tra lity , o r the  dangers of stationing US bases on its soils, 
or historical analysis showing th a t America was m ainly responsible for m ain ­
tain ing  the Cold W ar, or dem onstrations that the US was conducting subversion 
of o ther countries by the use of the CIA and its innum erab le  fronts? Yet 
research bodies in  these fields which dodge such enquiries . . . are, intellectually 
speaking not worth a cracker.
Where does the Centre obtain its funds? W hen it was being 
established Sir John  Crawford had adamantly denied rum ours of 
financial assistance from the Ford Foundation, but today the ANU 
publicly acknowledges that the funds are coming from this source. 
T he Ford Foundation in  fact has been the most active foundation 
in the broad field of international relations, including grants to 
establish and m aintain the Institute for Strategic Studies in London. 
Professor Hans J. M orgenthau of the University of Chicago has 
commented on
the enormous positive and negative influence which foundations exert upon 
the «K:“Cts, results, and m ethods of research. T hey rew ard certain  types of 
research by supporting  them  and stim ulate more research of the  same type 
by prom ising to support it. On the  o ther hand, they thw art or m ake impossible 
o ther types of research by not supporting  them . T h e  political scientist 
who wants to share in these rewards and, by doing so, gain prestige and power 
w ithin the profession cannot help  being influenced by these positive and 
negative expectations in his concept of the social t ru th  of the  m ethods by 
which to seek it, and  of the  relevant results to be expected from it.) 8
T he assumptions of the Cold W ar are accepted by the Ford Found­
ation. Thus it favours projects in which all questions are sub­
merged to the national interest. W riting in The Village Voice (6 
July 1967), two young New Left social scientists, T odd G itlin and 
Bob Ross, noted that the consequences of a grant from the CIA, the 
State Department or the Ford Foundation, were identical — “ to 
expedite America’s foreign penetrations, and to render them  legiti­
mate; to decorate the gendarmerie of the world with ribbons of 
rationality and liberalism.” Looking at the claim that the Congress 
for Cultural Freedom’s newly-found ties with the Ford Foundation
i s  H ans J. M orgenthau, "T h e  Purpose of Political Science”, in Jam es C. 
C harlesw orth (ed.), A Design for Political Science: Scope, Objectives, and 
M ethods (Philadelphia: Am erican Academy of Political and  Social Science,
1966), pp.70-71.
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indicated that it was no longer a Cold W ar instrum ent, 1. F. Stone’s 
Weekly (3 April 1967) commented:
Frankly, we d o n ’t th in k  th e  shift from CIA to  Ford  makes m uch difference. 
T h e  Ford  Foundation , w ith  McGeorge B undy a t its head, like the  Rockefeller 
Foundation, w hich Dean Rusk long ran , are p a rt of th e  same pom pous 
American establishm ent. . . These stuffed sh irt in stitu tions are no  m ore likely 
to finance independent and critical w riting  on  Am erican policy in  V ietnam  
or L atin  Am erica th an  w ould the CIA.
And Conor Cruise O ’Brien has m aintained that the way in which 
international political studies are today supported and organized 
in America involves m anipulation:
M any of these studies, bo th  respectable and o ther, are financed either by some 
branch of the U nited  States governm ent o r by some foundation  whose policies 
are the same as those of th e  U nited  States governm ent, from which it  may 
even acquire its highest personnel. W hen we find th a t m any of these studies 
also d isto rt reality , in  a sense favorable to US policy and reassuring to  US 
opinion, it is ap p aren t th a t here  the m orality  of scholarship has been 
exposed to tem ptation  and in  some cases has succum bed w ith enthusiasm .19
T he role of civilian militarists in Australia will certainly become 
more im portant in the next few years. Already The Australian (8 
May 1968) has editorialised on the urgent need for a “think tank”, 
along the lines of the RAND Corporation, to modernise Australian 
m ilitary organisation and strategic thinking. It was immediately 
joined by Professor Hedley Bull who told a defence forum at the 
University of M elbourne that the rigid division between public 
servants and armed forces personnel on the one hand and academics, 
parliam entarians and journalists on the other, impoverished think­
ing about defence matters on both sides. He added that the Aus­
tralian defence machine needed to be subjected to the sort of 
“intellectually rigorous political, strategic and economic analysis” 
that transformed the American war machine under former Secretary 
of Defence Robert M cNamara — a transform ation in which the 
key role was performed by the RAND Corporation, (The Austra­
lian, 8 May 1968).
T here has been a clear connection between the “disinterested” 
scientist and America’s arsenal of exotic weaponry, between the 
“dispassionate” anthropologist and the dom ination of primitive 
peoples, between the “objective” sociologist and the m anipulation 
of power elites in under-developed countries, and between the 
academic centre of strategic studies and counterinsurgency warfare. 
As Irving Louis Horowitz noted when he entered a plea for moving 
beyond the findings of the civilian militarists, such a step would 
he to move into “a clearer and cleaner use of social and political 
science.”20
19 O 'Brien, op.cit., p.70.
20 Horowitz, T h e  W ar Game, p.28. 
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